he relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas has been that of an ever-evolving struggle to decide who will be the leading force in the struggle for Palestinian independence. Using their very different ideologies, that of the secular nationalist and the Islamists nationalist respectively, these two groups have done much to decide the path that the Palestinian people have taken in their struggle to rid themselves of Israeli occupation. The relationship between the two groups has been complex and has evolved much during the 18 years of Hamas’s existence. The future of these two groups and the Palestinian people will be decided by how well these groups coexist with each other and also how effectively they are able to balance ideology in respect to the current political situation.
Even though Hamas is only 18 years old itself, its roots are with the Muslim Brotherhood Organization, which first came to Palestine in the 1930’s. The “goal of Brotherhood was to transform society to approximate as closely as possible that was establish by the Prophet Muhammed and his companions(Abu-Amar, 6)” This was a viewed as prerequisite to finding a solution to the conflict with Israel. The ideology of the Brotherhood largely comes from Hasan Al-Banna during the 1930s. He was living under British rule in Egypt and after the secular government in Egypt had repeatedly been undermined and weakened by its colonial master, he sought a way to return the historically powerful Egypt back into prominencei. He helped define an Islamic nationalist goal, a future that made “no distinction between religion and government, with the Quran and the sunna serving as the basis for all life( Abu-Amr 6)”.
The Brother adhered to the policy of not actively challenging the occupation authorities. The Brotherhood focused its energies on social and educational programs, and this in turn made a portion of the Palestinian population sympathetic to its cause. Because they were dealing with the everyday realities of the occupation, this limited the movement’s appeal to the majority of Palestinians. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO was the nationalist force that opposed the occupation and was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
This non-confrontational policy lead the Israeli authorities to cast a blind eye on the Brotherhood’s programs and allowed it to gain a strong institutional footing in Palestinian territory. The Israelis, preferred this organization to the then confrontational PLO, and encouraged it and funded it.iiThe Brotherhood was also encouraged throughout the Middle East by the United States, as a way to counterbalance secular forces that may have favored closer ties to the Communist blociii.
A major turning point came in 1973 with the formation of the Islamic Center by Shayak Ahmad Yasin who rose as a leader in the Brotherhood (and eventually Hamas). He consolidated power among the Brotherhood and greatly strengthened the Brotherhood’s influence in the occupied territories. By the late 1970’s disillusionment within the secular resistance movement was growing. The Islamic revolution in Iran also inspired Islamists. The Brotherhood’s influence increased because it was not actively resisting the Israelis, so it was able to strengthen its organizational base, increasing control of waqf (Muslim religious endowments) to 10% of the total land of the Gaza Strip. The number of Mosques under the Brotherhoods control also increased and was used for gaining followers (Abu-Amr, 8).
Remaining constant throughout this period was that the main source of dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood came from its failure to resist the occupation. The events of the first Intifada made this policy impossible to continue. The reason the peace process was started, the reason Israel decided to reverse its previous position of not negotiating with the PLO, was the high price that it was paying for its brutal repression of the largely nonviolent Palestinian Intifada in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. As the world’s press noted, the Palestinians were no longer going to sit by idly as their land continued to be occupied and their people brutalized by the Israeli army. There was a widespread uprising after a number of Palestinian civilians were killed by an Israeli truck(Abu-Amr, 10). The Brotherhood had no choice but to embrace this uprising.
To do this, the leadership of the Brotherhood created a branch, Hamas, that would be responsible for resisting the occupation. By December 14, 1987, the leaders of the Brotherhood called on the Palestinians to arm up and resist the Israelis. In order to guide its followers, the leaders of Hamas created a charter outlining the movement’s goals and principles. The charter was in large created to gain popular support for Hamas.
The PLO had already legitimized itself as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. Therefore, Hamas did not seek to overthrow, or replace the PLO. As article 27 of the charter states, “the Palestine Liberation Organization is closest of the close to…” Hamas. At the same time, Hamas made its differences with the PLO ideology of secular nationalism very clear. As article 27 continues: “Secularist ideology is in total contradiction to religious ideologies”, Hamas ”… cannot exchange the current and future of Islam in Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our… (ideology and way of life)”.
One of Hamas’s central tenants is the indivisibility of Palestine, as stated in Article 11 “Palestine is an Islamic Waqf upon all Muslim generations till the day of resurrection. It is not the right to give up nor any part of it.” So for Hamas, “giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of its religion(Hamas Charter, Article 13)” and “Palestine is the heart of the earth”( Hamas Charter, Article 34). Hamas as well as the PLO charter had also originally embraced armed resistance as the way to free Palestine, as Article 9 of the PLO charter states states: “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.”
By 1988, “Arafat and the PLO agreed in 1988 to accept the “two state” solution based on “land for peace”’(Hanania). This went against the PLO’s own charter, which was adopted by the Palestine National Council in July 1968. The PLO charter originally resembled Hamas’s, the major difference being that it embraced a secular versus Islamist ideology. For example, Article 2 concurs with Hamas’s charter in that it states “Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.” Instead of relying on religious reasons, the PLO charter cites nationalistic reasons. Article 2-5 stress the PLO’s embrace of Arab nationalistic ideology. Both the PLO’s and Hamas’s charters attacked Zionism and its seizing of Palestinian lands.
By accepting the two-state solution, the PLO had thus amended their overall objectives, as stated in their charter of refusing to coexist with Israel. This showed that this secular movement was able to change in the face of an opportunity to at least begin to start achieving its overall objectives. This angered some Palestinians, especially the Islamists. Hamas’s charter in many ways was a direct response to this action by the PLO and the growing Intifada. By doing this, they moved into the role of the nationalist force opposing the occupation that the PLO had held up into this point. Because Palestinian society has traditionally been secular, this position, and along with Hamas’s continued charity and social programs would be the main source for the organization to gain support.
The creation of Hamas from the Brotherhood showed the ideological transformation, of which the followers of the Brotherhood movement were capable of. It was different from the Brotherhood in its far greater emphasis on the Palestine problem. By embracing armed resistance, the Hamas took a 180-degree turn from the path to which the Brotherhood had adhered to for decades. This was only the first major change in Hamas, and it foreshadowed that it could repeat this in the future.
The 1993 Oslo Accords were heralded as a breakthrough in the peace process by the press. The reality of the situation was very different. All of the central issues for the Palestinians, including sovereignty, statehood, final borders, and the question of settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and water were deferred. Israel got recognition or acceptance from most of the Arab world and developed commercial, political or indirect relations with major Arab countries. In light of the so-called breakthrough, the Palestinians were allowed to be pushed into the back of the minds of their supporters. All that the Palestinians actually got from Oslo was limited control of 17.2 % of the West Bank and Gaza, divided into 75 islands, all isolated by the Israeli-controlled territory and checkpointsiv.
Self-rule was instituted by PLO leader Yasser Arafat who acquiesced to Israel by accepting Oslo. Following the standard colonial pattern, in many ways he became a collaborator with the Israelis against his own people. In order to maintain his usefulness to the Israelis, he had to impose a harsh regime on those who he ruled. This rule only helped to increase the cycle of violence. Arafat’s administration was widely recognized to be corrupt. Not only did this serve to de-legitimize it in the eyes of the some Palestinians, but attracted followers to Hamas, which throughout its history maintained an impeccable image.
Eminent Middle East reporter Robert Fisk observed “the beauty of the trap into which Arafat had been driven into with Messianic confidence. If he refused to confront Islamic forces, it [proved] he couldn’t be trusted with more land- as he was entitled under Oslo. If he fought into a civil war- proved he presided over anarchy, [this gave the Israelis a] good reason why he should be given no more territory(Fisk, 419)”. And the longer it took for the Palestinians to see the fruits of Oslo, the more discontent they would become.
Hamas originally offered to join PLO on terms it knew to be unacceptable (Kristianasen, 20). But the fact that it offered to join the PLO showed that was flexible, and might be more so in the future. In December of 1992, the then still inexperienced Hamas killed five Israeli soldiers then kidnapped and killed a border guard. This resulted in the expulsion of 400 Islamists to Marj- al_Zuhur in Lebanon.On the slopes of these mountains was created the Islamic University, which would be the education ground of many future leaders of Hamas (Fisk, 430-431).
This outraged Palestinians and led to further attacks on Israelis. International pressure eventually allowed the deportees to return. During this period, Hamas rethought much of its strategy. Furthermore, Jordan granted Hamas leader Musa Ab Marzuq residency. His rising power reflected in “the movement’s shift from the early, fiercely Islamic rhetoric of its 1988 charter and its early communiqués to a more modern, secular style. “(Kristianasen, 21) The movement was reinforced by a new generation of professionals, and a new strategy. It then proceeded to address the outside world in its own language, which was an attempt to enhance Hamas’s image.
As early as November 1993, the now jailed Shayak Yasin wrote an open letter- calling for possible cease-fire with Israel for ten or twenty years- if it would withdraw from occupied territories. This has been echoed since then. Far from being a radical demand, it repeats UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, ‘which emphasized “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” [and] demanded the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”’(Fisk, 383).
Yasin also suggested that Hamas begin “challenging the legislative institution from within, this lead to Hamas taking part in elections. At the same time, called on Palestinians to oppose Oslo ‘by all civilized means’ (Kristianasen, 23)”.The majority of the Palestinians inside the occupied territories, initially supported the Peace Process and Oslo, and the soon to be born Palestinian Authority (Kristianasen,21). Hamas knew this and stepped back its rhetoric in 1994. It changed it policy and only attacked when Israel directly provoked it. The occupation itself was no longer a justification for an attack in itself; this was another major strategic shift for Hamas.
Also in November 1993, a Jewish settler killed a Palestinian civilian. Graffiti in Hebron declared that “The Islamic Movement of Hamas will kill the man who killed Takal Bakari”. Talking to Fisk, a Palestinian named Ibrahin declared that “Hamas men [will] strike down the seller of our country”, [in a reference to Yasser Arafat]. At the same time Israel opened a dialogue with Hamas –General Doron Almog of the Israeli learned that Hamas preferred “the continuation of the Israeli occupation over Arafat’s control under autonomy”. Even Hamas didn’t know why Israel would undermine the PLO leader,: “The truth was, of course, elements in the Israeli army that wanted to destroy Oslo(Fisk, 408-409)”. This was apparent to Fisk as he was reflecting back twelve years later, but it was not evident to many at the time.
The next major turning point came when Baruch Goldstein massacred Palestinian worshippers in the Mosque at Abraham’s tomb in Hebron on February 25, 1994. The Islamists responded to the Hebron Massacre by bombing a bus in Afula. This resulted in the mass deportation and imprisonment of Hamas leaders. This in turn led to a new militant leadership, relying heavily on Muslim Brotherhood apparatus in Jordan and Egypt.
In November 1994 the PA shot Islamist protesters in Gaza. The Israeli army shot down Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank(Fisk, 419-420). As conflict degenerated to suicide bombings, Israeli air attacks, extrajudicial executions, house destruction and massive [Israeli] land grabbing- Palestinians were blamed by both Israel and American for failure to control violence and accept the deal for 64% of the 22%left to negotiate over. At this point in time “it is vital to establish that Israel reneged on every major accord and understanding that was signed in coming years(Fisk, 419)
By 1995 there was a virtual dictatorship in Gaza. Arafat instituted secret midnights for those that disagreed with his rule, where Islamists were given 25-year sentences. The PA had ten competing intelligence services. There were mass arrests of political opponents, and harsh measures against the press. The PA also liased with Israeli security forces, who instructed them on various types of torture(422, Fisk).
Arafat’s harsh rule served to alienate much of the Palestinian people. According to Amnesty International: “killings of Palestinians by Israeli security services or settlers have led to suicide bombings and the deaths of Israeli civilians. These have led to waves of arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture and unfair trials[by Palestinian Security forces]. The Palestinian population have been the main victims of such violations…the Occupied territories have become a land of barriers, mostly erected by Israeli security services, between town and town and village and village.”v
By the end of 1995, with much of its 1994 militant leadership imprisoned, a new younger generation attuned with secular nationalism and ties with Fatah shifted Hamas policy and took a more pragmatic political stance. Another transformation was achieved. Hamas evolved again, as its leaders wanted to preserve Hamas’s gains and turn it into a political party that could participate in the PA. Beyond this, Hamas’s attempts of Islamicization of Palestinian society was also watered down, and demands on women wearing Hijab and Koranic moral conduct were reduced or rescinded. (Kristianasen, 25-26) The PA went along with this in order to increase its popularity and to make Hamas agree to a cease-fire that was necessary for the peace process to continue with Israel. “The outcome was an undeclared moratorium on armed attacks…[that lasted] from September 1995 to February 1996 (Kristianasen, 27). ”
The end of the ceasefire was caused by the assassination of two major Islamists figures by Israel. The result was four suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem which in turn resulted in an unprecedented crackdown on Islamists by the PA. The attacks by the Islamists were in part caused by a lack of strong leadership within Hamas.
Finally by 1997, Hamas’s leaders were able to build a consensus within the party and agreed to three important points, which included a cessation of hostilities with the PA, limiting the armed struggle to retaliatory actions against soldiers and settlers only, and an effort to acquire assistance and support from Muslim and Arab countries, in an effort to gain for international support. This was a landmark for Hamas and marked yet another large change in its policies.
By 1998, Yasin was finally released from Israeli imprisonment and again put forth another decree: promising to end violence if a Palestinian state was established and Israel abided by UN Security Resolution 242(Kristianasen, 31). This of course, was not to happen.
Between 1991 and 2000, the number of Israeli settlers doubled from 200,000 to 400,000. The people living under occupation were subjected to increasingly harsh treatment, as they watched the peace process stutter and fail. By the year 2000, things were getting desperate. After last ditch efforts at Camp David and Taba, talks were suspended without any significant deals as new governments took power in the United States and Israel. After seven years and virtually no real progress, all that was needed was the slightest spark to the powder keg of their denied aspirations for the situation to explode.vi This came in the form of Ariel Sharon and one thousand Israeli troops visiting the Temple Mount, sparking the second Intifiada.
Since the start of the second Intifada, the Palestinians have been subjected to extreme collective punishment at the hand of the Israeli army. These responses took three main forms: illegal killings, tortures, and house demolitionsvii. According to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the occupied Territories, B’Tselem, 3,386 Palestinians have been killed since September 2000, 1,008 of them were classified as combatants, and 676 of them were children. During the same period, 992 Israelis were killed, of those, 309 were security forces and 118 were children. Amnesty International writes “Israeli security services have routinely tortured Palestinian political suspects on the occupied territories”viii. B’Tselem counts that 4170 Palestinian homes have also been destroyed since the beginning of the second Intifada.ix
After Mahmud Abbas won presidency of the PA after Yasser Arafat’s death, he decided to democratize the PLO and change Fatah into a modern democratic movement. This was in order to remove Arafat loyalists and others who were opposed to his popular policies of cease-fire, reform and negotiations with Israel. This would be a way to revitalize the PLO which had been losing support and credibility. Hamas agreed to a year long cease-fire and to take part in the municipal elections in December of 2005. As a large result of the continued seizure of Palestinian lands and further revelations of PA corruption, Hamas won major gains(Usher,6 ).
This was followed by the January 2006 elections where Hamas, benefiting from deep divisions within Fatah, won a majority of the seats in the PA while only getting about a third of the Palestinian vote(Usher,7). Although foreshadowed by the December elections, this was still a shock to all parties involved. Abbas reacted by calling on the members of the major Fatah bodies to resign. He then attempted to consolidate power in the office of the presidency in a move designed to decrease the power of the democratically elected PA with the new Hamas majority. This move was protested by Hamas but encouraged by Israel and the United States who were shocked and outraged at Hamas’s victory.
Palestinians have a deeply secular past and the community has strong and vocal minorities of Jews and especially Christians who would be automatically opposed to a Islamic society. Even the majority of Palestinian Muslims, as shown in the analysis of recent polling results, did not vote for the Islamic party. The fact that Hamas won a majority of the seats was more a symptom of the weakness PLO and the failure for the peace process to improve conditions for the Palestinians.
The future of Hamas and the PLO will largely be decided by how they handle the increasing pressure being levied on it by Israel, the United States and the rest of the international community. In the past they have shown a willingness to compromise and suspend its acts of violence if Israel reciprocates, and this must continue. The difference is that now Hamas and the PLO’s role within the PA have been switched.
Hamas must understand that in the current power relationship between it and Israel, Hamas has absolutely no possible way of carrying out its overall objective of destroying the state of Israel. Furthermore, as has been made abundantly clear, the US and Israel are doing everything at their disposal to discredit and undermine the Hamas government. This has included secretly funding the PA before the last electionsx, to blocking all international aid, blocking the PA’s from receiving the tax revenue from it is entitled to and criminalizing contact with Hamas members. This is predicted to result in a humanitarian crises as the PA will be unable to pay its employees.
In the face of such odds, it has yet to be determined if Palestinians will rally around their elected leaders. The West’s attempt to undermine Hamas has been clear to all, and help to reinforce the idea that it is only for democracy on its termsxi. To its credit, Hamas has maintained a unilateral cease-fire for the past year and refrained from responding to Israeli attacks. At the same time, it justified an Islamic Jihad suicide bombing against Israel as self-defense. This only added fuel to its Israeli and US detractors. At the same time, Hamas cannot simply renounce self-defense as its core supporters will see this as Hamas following the same path as did the PLO did.
Throughout Hamas’s existence, but especially since 1993, Hamas has gone through various evolutions and changes. Since its inception it has repeatedly shown that its ideology, as described in its charter and by its Muslim Brotherhood roots, can and will be set aside when political gain for the party and the Palestinian people seems possible. Fatah must also examine its ideological goals and examine if moving away from the democratic process just because it lost in elections is in the best interests of the future of the Palestinians. The future of both movements will depend on how they balance ideological goals with the immediate goals of survival for the Palestinian people. And furthermore, if despite their ideological differences, the two main Palestinian political movements they can show a united front to the outside world as this will likely benefit both parties and the Palestinian people.
Works Quoted:
i Rashid Khalidi,"The United States and Palestine" in Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East(Boston: Beacon Press, 2004.
ii Ray Hanania, “Sharon’s Terror Child: How the Likud Bloc Mid-wifed the Birth of Hamas” Counterpunch.org, January 18/19, 2003.
iii Peter Bergen, “The Wrong War: Backdraft: How the war in Iraq has fueled Al Qaeda and ignited its dream of global jihad.” Mother Jones Magazine. July/August 2004 Issue
iv ibid i
v Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 333.
vi Ibid, i
viii http://www.btselem.org/english/Press_Releases/20060104.asp
x Scott Wilson and Glenn Kessle “U.S. Funds Enter Fray In Palestinian Elections”. Washington Post Foreign Service. January 22, 2006http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101431.html
xi Jamil Hilal, “Hamas’s rise as chartered in the Polls, 1994-2005. Journal Of Palestine Studies vol. XXXV, No 3. (Spring 2006), pp1-14.
Works Quoted:
1. Krstianasen, Wendy “Challenge And Counterchallenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo”. Journal Of Palestine Studies XXVIII, no 3 (Spring 1999).
2. Fisk, Robert “The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East”(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).
3. Usher, Graham “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections”. Journal Of Palestine Studies XXXV, No 3(Spring 2006).
4. Abu-Amr, Ziad “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background” Journal Of Palestine Studies vol. XXII, no. 4(Summer 1993).
5. Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement(Hamas) Of Palestine. Journal Of Palestine Studies vol. XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993).
6. PLO Charter. Palestinian National Authority- The Official Web Site. Adopted July 1-17, 1968. http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/plo_Charter.asp
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