Noam Chomsky’s Rethinking Camelot; JFK, the Vietnam War and US Political Culture is an ambitious book. Written on the 30th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, Chomsky sets out to challenge what he calls the “Kennedy Revival”. Going beyond that, he attempts to put the Vietnam War into a broader context: that of the 500 years that have passed since Christopher Columbus “discovered” the Americas and started the European conquest of this region and the rest of the globe.
As part of the introductory chapter, Chomsky attempts to identify the “direct line of descent” (5) between the Vietnam War and the war of extermination against the Natives Americans. He notes how Frenchmen Alexis de Tocqueville “was struck that the conquerors could deprive people of their rights and exterminate them ‘with singular felicity, tranquility, legally, philanthropically without shedding blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world’. It was impossible to destroy people with ‘more respect for the laws of humanity,’ he wrote.”… Of the founding fathers.
Chomsky then moves to the topic of the First Seminole War. “The Spanish Minister concluded that ‘The war against the Seminoles has been merely a pretext for General Jackson to fall, as a conqueror, upon the Spanish provinces…for the purposes of establishing there the dominion of this republic upon the odious basis of violence and bloodshed’-‘strong language from a diplomat,’ [William] Weeks writes, ‘yet a painfully precise description of how the United States first came to control the province of Florida.”’ As Secretary of State, [John Quincy] Adams had the tasking of justifying what General Jackson had achieved. So he did, using the opportunity to establish the doctrine of executive war without congressional approval that was extended to new dimensions in the Indochina wars.”(6)
After giving the reader a very radical frame of reference to work with, Chomsky moves to his thesis. The specific purpose of this book is to challenge what Chomsky sees as a myth propagated about Kennedy’s legacy and assassination. He specifically cites Oliver Stone’s movie JFK. Stone and others associated with mainstream and especially so called ‘liberal’ culture have propagated the idea that Kennedy was assassinated because he was endorsing a unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam, or other high-level policy changes that could threaten powerful interests in government. Using four sources of evidence including historical facts, public statements, internal government planning records, and memoirs and other reports of Kennedy insiders, Chomsky examines whether such theories have any basis in reality.
First Chomsky explores whether JFK was indeed ideologically different from his predecessors. Chomsky asserts that when JFK was elected, he adopted doctrines already established by previous administrations. The most important of these was the rotten apple theory, which is well documented in internal documentation, but not well known in the mainstream, and for example, totally absent from our assigned textbook. This theory states that radical nationalism is not to be allowed in the Third World. This could result in the possible success of such an independent government, a virus, which could spread to other countries in the periphery and undermine US power across the globe. This was the main pretext that Kennedy used to continue and expand US involvement in Asia as well as South America.
Chomsky also challenges the idea that the US government viewed Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as Chinese and Soviet communist puppets. [Quote from textbook]. Chomsky argues that in 1948 Minh was recognized as an independent nationalist, and this fact, rather than the notion that the government thought he was a communist, made him threatening. “Evidence of ‘Kremlin-directed conspiracy” could be found ‘in virtually all countries except Vietnam,’ which appeared to be ‘an anomaly.’ Nor could links with China be detected”(13). He was considered a threat to the power responsible for Vietnam’s well being (France , which had Vietnam in its colonial grip for the better part of the previous century). In these same internal documents, China, Vietnam’s northern neighbor and longtime dominant foreign influence in Vietnamese affairs, was to be excluded because it was an “alien interest”, unlike the countries responsible for it (France and the US) (48).
Another important idea passed down from previous administrations was the idea of the Domino Theory, first stated by President Eisenhower in 1954. This stated that Japan was the key to stability and peace in the Eastern Hemisphere. In order for Japan to succeed, it had to have its southern empire reinstated to roughly WWII levels as an area for its economic exploitation. This was necessary for Japan to be able to withstand Communism. It follows that any disruption of economic zone that could spread would take away Japan’s ability to survive economically, and it would result in the entire area and eventually Japan falling under communist control.
Finally, there is the National Security Council decision passed down a few weeks after the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954. This treaty was supposed to allow the French to withdraw and give Vietnam time to establish the institutions needed for future elections to take place. These elections were to take place in 1956. The NSC decision stated that “even in the case of ‘local Communist subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack,’ the US would consider the use of military force, including an attack on China if it is ‘determined to be the source’ of the ‘subversion’(NSC 5429/2)”(41). Chomsky adds that in 1955 the Joint Chiefs outlined 3 types of aggression: literal aggression between two states, overt armed attack from within the area of each of the sovereign states, or the third kind, aggression other than armed. It follows that, “an internal uprising against a US-imposed police state, or elections that come out the wrong way, are forms of ‘aggression’, which the US has the right to combat by arbitrary forms of violence” (41). As Chomsky mentions, it goes without saying that such actions violate the fundamental understanding of the charter of the United Nations, and international law.
Chomsky argues that these four points constituted the core of the doctrinal framework that was established by his predecessors, and was the same one Kennedy adopted during his time in office. This core explains why American presidents viewed countries such as Vietnam as a threat, even though, as they understood in Vietnam’s case, the country might not be controlled by Soviet or Chinese communist forces. Also, it gives the justification that was needed to view elections that didn’t come out the desired way as dangerous, and answerable by force.
Again, it is important to remember that the nature of the conspiracy theorists that Chomsky is responding to. The underlying justifications to their theories is the notion that President Kennedy was a man that wanted peace in Vietnam and was preparing to unilaterally withdraw US forces. Chomsky proceeds to address this specific issue. He examines Kennedy’s actions and statements to understand his position on withdrawal. It is interesting to note that in 1959 Kennedy said that “Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia”. He was aware that US appointed President Diem of South Vietnam had already suspended the elections that were to have taken place in 1956, and was generally a corrupt and brutal dictator. The elections agreed upon in the 1954 Geneva accords never took place in the South because the Vietnamese government understood that it had no support among its constituents and any free elections would result in a Communist victory.
As Kennedy came into office, the South Vietnamese government was on the verge of collapse. As a result, Kennedy escalated the war effort. The fruits of this escalation looked promising: “By late spring of 1962, the Pentagon Papers analyst observes, “the prospects looked bright” and “to many the end of the insurgency seemed in sight”’ (66). These achievements enabled Kennedy to report in his January 1963 State of the Union message that ‘“The spearpoint of aggression as been blunted in South Vietnam.” In [close Kennedy associate and historian Arthur] Schlesinger’s own words: “1962 had not been a bad year: aggression checked in Vietnam”’(67).
This success allowed for talk of withdrawal. But the main point that Chomsky makes here is that all talks of withdrawal were preconditioned on complete military victory, and would not be considered unless this objective was achieved. He thereby adds fuel to his argument that Kennedy was not breaking from the doctrinal norm, and was not advocating or even considering a unilateral withdrawal that might have made his assassination necessary in the eyes of some.
Chomsky uses two sources of information to base his claim that talks of withdrawal were conditioned on complete military victory: the initial press reports that followed these discussions, and the reference to them in the Pentagon Papers. “On January 25, 1963, the Comprehensive Plan was presented to The Joint Chiefs”…stating that “the phase-out of the US special military assistance is envisioned as generally occurring during the period July 1965-June 1966,’ earlier when feasible.”’ This was based on the belief that the Viet Cong should be eliminated between 1-3 years after the South Vietnamese forces become operationally independent. MACV Commander General Harkins believed that it would take one year, but Secretary of Defense McNamara chose the conservative 3 year estimate. A Joint Chiefs of Staff investigative team concurred with this decision (68-69).
At the same time, an escalation of violence was planned. Along with the ungoing US Farmgate operations, armed helicopters that were already serving in an escort role ‘“should be allowed to attack ‘Viet Cong targets of opportunity, in a combat situation,’ even if not fired upon’.” … “Another recommendation was to go beyond ‘the minor intelligence and sabotage forays[1 line not declassified]’ to ‘a coordinated program of sabotage, destruction, propaganda, and subversive missions against North Vietnam .”’ (69).
Chomsky concludes:”we thus learn that in January 1963, in an atmosphere of great optimism, the military initiatives for withdrawal went hand-in-hand with plans for escalation of the war within South Vietnam and possibly intensified operations against North Vietnam(70). He also notes how “similarly, in November 1967, General Westmoreland announced that with victory imminent, US troops could begin to withdraw in 1969…that recommendation does not show that [Westmoreland] was a secret dove”(67). In fact, Westmoreland was anything but.
Overall, Chomsky’s book does an excellent job of refuting conspiracy theorists that believe that JKF was assassinated because he was a ‘secret dove’, planned unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam or was planning drastic changes to the government. This is no small task because to do so, he had to challenge just about every underlying belief about not only the Kennedy administration, but the entire history of America that is propagated today. Citing many sources and passages ignored by contemporary historians, Chomsky paints a context of American history and a picture of the Vietnam War very different than that presented in the mainstream.
Not only does he successfully identify the core justifications for such conspiracy theories, he uncovers ample internal documentation that is hard, if not impossible to refute, because it is not covered by the mainstream press. This combines with the fact that he draws such a radically different conclusion of American history than one is lead to believe by the mainstream. Through Rethinking Camelot Chomsky essentially wins the reader over to his primary objective of persuasion: for the reader to look up the passages that he cites and to double check his facts, and to reconsider many commonly held beliefs.
Bibliography
Chomsky, Noam. Rethinking Camelot; JFK, the Vietnam War and US Political Culture. Boston: South End Press, 1993.
1 comment:
Excellent summary
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